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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
LORENZO VERNAL EWELL,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, BYRON EWELL, doing business as ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and THE STATE
INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

Case No.
7700

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in Plaintiff's Brief
is substantially correct, except the references to the testimony of Dr. Harry Berman.
Lorenzo V. Ewell, the applicant and plaintiff, filed his
application with the Industrial Commission on September
19, 1950, in which he requested compensation for an in-
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dustrial accidental injury. He designated May 29, 1950, as
the date of the accident and he specified the accidental injury as being caused by a flash from a welding machine
getting into his eyes.
In the hearing held by the Industrial Commission on
November 22, 1950, Dr. Berman testified that he was first
consulted by Mr. Ewell in April, 1948, for treatment of
chronic sinusitis with nasal polyps in both sides of his nose.
Dr Berman next saw him on August 12, 1948. At that time
Mr. Ewell had a condition called: pterygium in both eyes.
Pterygium is a patch of thickened conjunctiva extending
over part of the cornea. In 1948 the pterygi urn in the right
eye was worse than the one in the left eye. The doctor
operated on the right eye at that time. The doctor also told
him that sooner or later he would have to have the pterygium
in the left eye operated on.
Mr. Ewell testified that on May 29, 1950, he got a flash
in his eyes from a welder's torch and his eyes were irritated
and inflamed from then until July 21, 1950. However, he
did not lose any time from work until he went to Dr. Berman's office on July 14, 1950. That was. the first time Dr.
Berman saw him since he removed the pterygium from Mr.
Ewell's. right eye in 1948.
Plaintiff's brief has correctly stated that the Industrial
Commission found that Mr. Ewell was disabled from work
for one week from July 14, 1950 to July 21, 1950, because of
inflammation in his eyes resulting from the flash burn;
also the Commission found and concluded that his accident
was not the cause of the pterygium in Mr. Ewell's left eye,
which Dr. Berman operated on July 29, 1950.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE INDUST'RIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT
LEGALLY REQUIRED T·o HOLD THAT THE
SURGICAL REMOVAL OF THE PTERYGIUM
IN APPLICANT'S LEFT EYE WAS COMPENSABLE.
After reading the brief of plaintiff's attorney, it is, not
quite clear to us whether he is trying to prove a case under
the workmen's compensation law or the occupational disease
law. The one and only numbered point in his argument,
(p. 5), states that "the pterygium in plaintiff's left eye
was the result of a compensable industrial accident." He
also specified the electric flash from the welder's torch as
being the industrial accident responsible for his eye trouble.
However, on page 7 of his brief, he argues that the pterygium may have been caused by the impact of dust and sand
on plaintiff's eye ball between August, 1948 and May 29,
1950, or by the flash burn on May 29, 1950, or partly by
each of those factors.
The first of the above mentioned alternatives would
be an argument for applying the occupational disease law to
this case. But if Mr. Ewell's eye trouble were definitely
proved to have been caused by constant irritation from substances to which he was exposed by his employment, it could
not come under the workmen's compensation law. The workmen's compensation law deals with accidents. An accident
occurs· in a. very short period of time.· On the other hand~
an occupational disease is caused· by exposure to harmful
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substances over a considerable period of time. Has applicant's attorney changed his theory of the case between pages
5 and 7 of his. brief?
We are not willing to concede that an applicant has
the. right to make a claim before the Industrial Commission
for disability claimed to have resulted from an industrial
accident, and end up in the Supreme Court claiming benefits
under the occupational disease law. But, for the sake of
argument, if he does have the legal right to switch his
position by starting out with one kind of claim and ending
up with the other kind or a combination of the two, we do
not think the record will support plaintiff's challenge of the
Industrial Commission's, decision.
The argument contained in plaintiff's brief might have
been properly directed to the Industrial ·commission after
its bearing of this claim and 'before it rendered its decision.
In other words, the points which plaintiff's attorney has
attempted to make might have been addressed to the Industrial Commission in an effort to persuade the commission to arrive at certain findings and conclusions from the
evidence in the record. But most of the argument in the
brief is not properly addressed to the Supreme Court.
Plaintiff's argument amounts substantially to the proposition that inasmuch as there was medical evidence that
the pterygium in applicant's left eye coulm have been aggravated by the electric flash on May 29, 1950, or by continual
irritation from wind and dust in his employment for a period
of almost two years, the Industrial Commission was thereby required, as a matter of law, to find that such was the
fact and award compensation to him for the operation.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

Plaintiff's attorney apparently has overlooked the
legislative demarcation between the powers and functions
of the Industrial Commission and the Supreme Court in
workmen's compensation and occupational disease cases.
Section 42-1-79 of the workmen's· compensation law p~o
vides:
"The findings and conclusions of the commission
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and final and
shall not be subject to review; such questions of fact
shall include ultimate facts and the findings and
conclusions of the commission."
Substantially the same provision is found in Section
42-la-40 of the occupational disease law.
In the case of Crane vs. Industrial Commission, 97 Utah
244, 92 Pac. (2nd) 722, the facts were that on April4, 1938,
Mr. Crane fell while he was at work in his employer's mine
and injured his back and knee. He continued to work until
May 7th, on which date his leg was red and swollen and
ached cons,iderably. He was examined by a doctor on May
lOth and his knee was found to be seriously infected. On
May 14th a core was taken from his knee. After a hearing,
the Industrial Commission denied his claim for compensation; and the Supreme Court sustained ·the commission's
decision. In its decision, the Supreme Court quoted the
following language from the Kent and Parker cases:

Kent vs. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 381, 57 Pac.
(2nd) 724.
"In the case of denial of compensation, the ·record must disclose that there is material, substantial,
competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to
make a disregard of its justify the conclusion, as a
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matter of law, that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the evidence or
unreasonably refused to believe such evidence.
* * * When we are asked to overturn the findings and conclusions of the commission denying compensation, it must be made clearly to appear that the
commission acted wholly without cause in rejecting
or in refus~ing to believe or give effect to the evidence. It is not intended by the Workmen's Compensation Act (Rev. St. 1933, 42-1-1 et seq.) that
this, court, in matters of evidence, should to any extent substitute the judgment of the court upon factual matters for the judgment of the commission."
Parker vs. lndtustrial Commission, 78 Utah 509, 5 Pac.
(2nd) 573.
"This court is not authorized to weigh conflicting evidence, nor is it authorized to direct which one
of two or more reasonable inferences must be drawn
from evidence which is not in conflict. That is the
peculiar province of the Industrial Commission."

In the case of Hutc-hings vs. Industrial Commission, 96
Utah 399, 87 Pac. (2nd) 11, toward the end of the court's
opinion is found the following:
"The question before the court is whether the
Industrial Commission, upon the record before it,
was, required as a matter of law to award compensation. In Globe Grain & Milling Company vs. lndustrwl Commission, 57 Utah 192, 193 Pac. 642, 643,
we stated the rule applicable here in the following
language:
"This court has repeatedly held that it will not
weigh the evidence, but will examine the same for the
purpose only of determining whether there is any
substantial competent evidence to sustain the find-
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ings or to support the award made by the commission. * * * If there is such evidence the findings will be sustained."
"And so it has been held in numerous cases
that the decision of the Industrial Commission will
not be disturbed where the evidence was such that
the Commission could reasonably find or conclude
that the death or disability of the employee was not
the result of accidental injury arising out of or in
the course of employment."
In the case of Holbrook vs. Ind'ustrial Commission, 92
Utah 251, 67 Pac. (2nd) 224, Eugene Holbrook, a night
watchman employed at the Wright Store in Ogden, died
June 30, 1936, from malignant endocarditis and geralized
septicemia. His widow applied for compensation, claiming
that his death was the result of an accidental injury suffered
March 9, 1936, when he fell down a flight of stairs, at his
employer's premises. The medical expert who testified before the Industrial Commission on behalf of the applicant,
was not very definite or clear in his opinion with respect to
causative connection between the accident and the death.
In sustaining the Industrial Commission's decision denying
the claim, the Supreme Court used the following language:
"While the testimony in this: case certainly
would have supported an award-in fact seems to
point rather decidedly that the fall aggravated a preexisting condition-yet, that question was for the
commission. The failure of the commission to arrive
at such conclusion, but to an opposite one that the
accident did not cause or contribute to decedent's
death, is not arbitrary. The commission, as in the
case of Norris vs. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah
256, 61 Pac. (2nd) 413, has concluded that the
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~evidence

of such connection was not satisfactorily
established. In that case there were conflicting
opinions of doctors. Here there was one doctor as
a witness and he himself furnishes conflicting opinions. He evidently was not very positive as. to the
real cause of the death. Under the rule in the Norris
case, the finding of the commission was not arbitrary. See also 0' Brien vs. Industrial Commission,
90 Utah 266, 61 Pac. (2nd) 418, as to the effect of
the testimony of 'probable cause.' Other cases in
which this court considered the matter of opinion
evidence in industrial cases are :
Parker vs. Industrial Commission, 78 Utah 509,
5 Pac. (2nd) 573;
Stanley vs. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah
228, 8 Pac. (2nd) 770;
Russell v~. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 306,
43 Pac. (2nd) 1069."

Dr. Berman told Mr. Ewell in 1948 that the pterygium
which he then had in his left eye would eventually have to
be operated on (R. 18). Dr. Berman also testified that that
condition would not clear up without medical treatment
(R. 14). He also testified that from the last time he saw
it in 1948 until the next time he saw it in July, 1950, the
pterygium had increased to the point where it needed surgical treatment (R. 15).
Dr Berman testified that the electric· flash of May 29,
1950, could have aggravated the pterygium or increased its
rate of growth. He also said that a pterygium's growth can
progress or can remain stationary for a while ( R. 21) .
Everything is possible in medicine ( R. 21) .
That kind of evidence certainly would not compel the
Industrial Commission, as a matter of law, to come to the
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conclusion that the electric flash of May 29, 1950, was responsible for requiring the surgery on the pterygium in
Mr. Ewell's left eye, which was performed on July 29,
1950.
Even if it were legal and proper for plaintiff to attempt
to make this. case a dual proceeding under both the workmen's compensation law and the occupational disease law,
we have shown that there is no legal basis upon which the
Industrial Commission might be reversed because of its
refusal to find a connection between the flash of May 29,
1950, and the pterygium operation. Then the possibilities of
any application of the occupational disease law to the circumstances of this case must be considered on their own merits.
Section 42-1a-28 of the occupational disease law lists 28
occupational diseases which are compensable. The first 27
mentioned, refer to metallic poisonings and other specific
disorders which are known to result from exposure to harmful substances used or existing in various. industries.. None
of these 27 could apply to Mr. Ewell's case. Subsection 28
was added to this section by the 1949 Legislature. It contains the only possibility of any provision of the occupational
disease law applying to this. case. But subsection 28 is
limited to those cases in which all of its provisions exist.
We quote:
Section 42-1a-28, subsection 28.
Such other diseases or injuries to health which
directly arise as a natural incident of the exposure
occasioned by the employment, provided, however,
that such a disease ~r injury to health shall be com~
pensable only in those instances where it is shown
by the employee or his dependents that all of the
following named circumstances were ··present: ( 1) a
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direct causal conne-ction between the conditions under which the- work is performed and the disease or
injury to health; (2) the disease or injury to health
can be seen to have followed as· a natural incident of
the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the
employment; ( 3) the disease or injury to health can
be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate
cause; ( 4) the disease or injury to health is not of
a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure outside of the employment; (5) the
disease or injury to health is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of the employer and the employee ; and ( 6) the
disease or injury to health must appear to have had
its, origin in a risk connected with the employment
and to have flowed from that source as a natural
consequence, though it need not have been forseen
or expected before discovery. No disease or injury to
health shall be found compensable where it is of a
character to which the general public is commonly
exposed.
All six of those provisions were not proved in this case.
In fact, applicant and his, attorney made no attempt to
prove a case before the Industrial Commission under this
section. They made no reference to the occupational disease
law in the proceedings before the Industrial Commission or
in their brief which was recently filed in this Court. The
testimony did contain a few casual remarks about some of
Mr. Ewell's work at times being in dusty atmosphere.
Also Dr. Berman observed that wind and dust could irritate
a pterygium and increase its rate of growth. Dr Berman
made the general statement that "anything which comes in
contact with a pterygium makes. it grow faster and encroach
on the cornea" ( R. 18) .
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Wind and dust were only some of the elements which
might have irritated and aggravated applicant's pterygium.
Wind and dust which he contacted outside of his employment
would have caused such irritation and aggravation the same
as that in his employment.
There was no evidence in this case that the condition
of pterygium is "incidental to the character of the business."
in which Mr. Ewell was engaged, as is required by the fifth
provision of subsection 28, which we have heretofore quoted.
Even if all of our foregoing arguments relating to the
occupational disease law were held to not apply to this case,
and if the Court should hold that all of the requirements of
subsection 28 of Section 42-1a-28 had been satisfied with
respect to aggravation of the pterygium in plaintiff's. left eye
by substances in his employment, it would then be necessary
that a determination be made of the proportionate causation
of plaintiff's trouble, as provided by Section 42-1a-51 of the
occupational disease law.
Before concluding this brief, we feel impelled to observe that the remarks of plaintiff's attorney on page 12 of
his brief, regarding plaintiff's. economic means are entirely
improper and are not in accordance with this Court's rules
or the statute relating to review proceedings such as this.
There is no evidence whatever in the record as to what plaintiff's financial condition is or was, except the fact that his
wages were $100.00 per week on May 29, 1950 (R. 5, 9
and 10).
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CONCLUSION
In view of the evidence and the law governing this case,
it appears that the Industrial Commission's decision awarded all of the compensation benefits to which applicant was
entitled. Therefore the Commission's decision should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General,
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorneys for Defendants.
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